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Euro-Crisis: Law and Interdisciplinarity 
In December 2014 a conference “Euro-Crisis: Law and Interdisciplinarity” was held in the context of  
a three-year project “Constitutional Change through Euro-Crisis law” funded by the EUI Research 
Council. This project intends to provide a comprehensive study of the effect of the crisis of the euro on 
national constitutional orders. In turn this study aims to offer a basis for further, especially 
comparative, studies of the legal status and implementation of legislative responses to the crisis at 
national level, the interactions between national legal systems and euro-crisis law, and the 
constitutional challenges that have been faced. The December conference brought together legal 
scholars and political scientists to reflect on the scope and limits of the legal discipline in reacting to 
the management of the crisis of the euro. Contributions were made on three topics: (1) how legal 
scholars have reacted to euro-crisis and the reforms adopted in its wake, with particular analysis of the 
main themes within legal scholarship on the issue; (2) whether and how other disciplines can help to 
understand and situate legal debates on euro-crisis; and (3) the relevance of the legal dimension for 
scholars from related social science disciplines such as political economy for their own perspective on 
euro-crisis and its policy consequences. 
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 Abstract 
Although several dimensions of the present euro-crisis have been analysed by students of European 
integration, the impact of the crisis on the political culture of EU leaders has been largely overlooked. 
The political culture of a nation, a social class or, in case of the EU, an elite consists of a system of 
beliefs, symbols, and values – the latter including conceptions of purpose – that defines the situation in 
which political action takes place. One of the roots of the traditional political culture of EU leaders 
was the Monnet strategy of fait accompli, which consisted in pushing ahead with integration without 
worrying about either public support or democratic legitimation. This approach was supported by the 
prevailing emphasis on the process of integration rather than on the concrete results of specific 
collective decisions. The most serious consequence of the political culture shared by most EU leaders 
was the tendency to disregard both feasibility constraints and the limits of collective action. Under the 
impact of the euro-crisis total optimism has been replaced by panic-driven austerity. The paper 
concludes by calling attention to the fact that there are various alternative approaches to regional (in 
particular, European) integration. One approach deserving particular attention in the present situation 
is the functional – rather than territorial – approach advocated by David Mitrany in the 1940s and by 
Ralph Dahrendorf in the 1970s. 
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Introduction: the n+1 dimensions of the euro-crisis 
Since 2010 a growing number of students of European integration emphasize the multi-dimensional 
nature of the present euro-crisis. Thus Kaarlo Tuori (2014) notes that the crisis has affected all aspects 
of EU constitutional development: the economic constitution but also the juridical constitution, the 
political constitution, and even the security constitution – the latter represented by the Amsterdam 
Treaty provisions in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. These different constitutional 
dimensions are linked to each other but, naturally, the economic and the political dimensions have 
been most directly affected by the crisis. The various attempts to resolve the crisis have produced a 
far-reaching revision of the traditional paradigm of the EU economic constitution – a paradigm based 
on a combination of expected economic growth, explicit rejection of burden-sharing mechanisms, and 
respect of national fiscal sovereignty. The latest legal and institutional developments, however, “revise 
that construction to the extent that they envisage some forms of mutualisation of costs and a number of 
constraints on the fiscal sovereignty of the Member States in a hardened economic governance” (Chiti 
and Teixeira 2013: 700). 
At the same time, the various responses to the crisis, while of doubtful effectiveness in policy terms, 
have succeeded in transforming the traditional democratic deficit of the EU into what may be more 
appropriately labelled as a democratic default (Majone 2014:196-202). Thus, the role of the national 
parliaments has been significantly constrained by the new regimes introduced by the 2012 Stability 
Treaty and related legislation. Now the Commission, not the national parliament, is the first institution 
where the proposed budget of a country in financial difficulties is examined. Moreover, the national 
legislature has only one month to adopt the budgetary law after the Commission opinion. The final 
outcome may well be that “[a] zone of influence dominated by the Commission and ECOFIN is 
established, with political conflicts taking place within these, but the atrophying of local democracy 
leads to a hollowing out of domestic processes so that these become little more than administrative 
containers” (Chalmers 2012: 693). This is precisely the point where the traditional democratic deficit 
of the EU turns into a democratic default. Unsurprisingly, by 2013 the distance between European 
citizens and EU institutions had reached a level unimaginable only a few years before, as made 
evident by massive anti-EU demonstrations in Athens, Lisbon, Madrid, and Barcelona. In Hungary 
burning the EU flag became a proper way of expressing deep dissatisfaction with the perceived 
indifference of “Europe” to the severe financial crisis of the country. Some analysts argue that what is 
happening in East Europe today is in many respects similar to the disenchantment with socialism of 
the 1970s and 1980s. This change of mood is explained by the fact that the great expectations which 
East Europeans had linked to the membership of their country in the EU have been largely 
disappointed. 
The importance rightly attached to these developments, however, has tended to mask the significance 
of another, and potentially even more significant, consequence of the euro-crisis: the collapse of the 
EU’s political culture of total optimism – a general attitude of the euro-elites that found its clearest 
expression in the Maastricht Treaty with its commitment to proceed with monetary union by a fixed 
date, notwithstanding the failure to reach agreement on some key aspects of monetary policy; despite 
the warning provided by the failure of the 1970 Werner Plan to achieve monetary union within ten 
years (!); and in total disregard of the deep concerns about the feasibility of the project, expressed by 
most of the world’s top monetary experts. 
Varieties of political culture 
‘The political culture of a society consists of the system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and 
values which defines the situation in which political action takes place. It provides the subjective 
orientation in politics’ (Verba 1965: 513). Thus defined, political culture is a collective property that 
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can vary across nations, social classes, ethnic groups, elites, etc. In fact, many of the earlier and best 
known applications of the concept focused upon the unique configuration of values, beliefs, and 
practices that supposedly constituted a nation’s culture. The significance of Almond and Verba’s 
typology of parochial, subject, and participatory orientations to politics was that it offered a 
classificatory scheme that enabled scholars to make cross-national comparisons among what had 
hitherto been seen as totally unique political cultures. This contributed to making political cultures 
comparable, but the analytical focus largely remained at the level of the nation-state. Differences 
between nations, rather than differences within nations, remained the central focus of inquiry. 
More recent research has shown that variation in political attitudes and values within countries are, in 
fact, often greater than those between countries. Thus it has been argued that there are more 
similarities in the beliefs of a French and a German social-democrat than between a French socialist 
and a French conservative or between a German social-democrat and a German Christian-democrat. 
Italy provides one of the clearest examples of the difficulties inherent in the concept of a “national 
political culture”. The work of Robert Putnam (1983, 1988) provides the best demonstration of the 
importance of cultural variation within the same country. In 1970 Italy established fifteen regional 
governments, and Putnam and his colleagues followed for some years the development of six regional 
governments through an array of studies, from election results to survey of mass opinion to elite 
interviews to criteria of administrative effectiveness. They discovered substantial variation among 
regions in political attitudes, participation, associationism, governmental effectiveness, economic 
growth, and much else. In particular, they found that high levels of socioeconomic development were 
necessary for stable and effective government – but not sufficient. That something else, they argue, is 
political culture, more specifically, a tradition of civic involvement. Particularly among the more 
economically developed regions, political culture helps explain otherwise inexplicable differences in 
institutional performance. Even more striking, they show that past political culture is a powerful 
predictor of present levels of socioeconomic development, while past levels of socioeconomic 
development have no impact whatsoever on political culture. Moreover, past political culture is at least 
as good as – and often better than – past socioeconomic development as a predictor of present 
socioeconomic development. As Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky (1990: 250) conclude: “A more 
decisive vindication of the position that culture matters would be difficult to imagine”. 
If it is misleading to speak of the political culture of a country like Italy, it is quite impossible to speak 
of the political culture of an association of states with different histories and political systems and at 
very unequal levels of socioeconomic developments, such as the European Union. In case of the EU 
the concept of a political culture makes sense only if it is applied to the elites operating in the EU 
framework, both at the national and the supranational level. It is only with reference to such elites that 
this concept will be used in the following pages. 
The making of a supranational political culture 
According to the Treaty on European Union, Article 107 (1), “The ESCB [European System of 
Central Banks] shall be composed of the ECB and of the national central banks”. This wording 
suggests that the authors of the treaty had assumed that all member states of the EU would join the 
monetary union – an overly optimistic assumption, as it turned out. Such a priori optimism is (or was 
until recently) a characteristic feature of the political culture of EU-style integration. It is also a major 
reason why crises always find EU leaders unprepared. Even Wim Duisenberg – who as (first) 
president of the ECB should have been better informed about the financial conditions of would-be 
members of the monetary union –was absolutely delighted when, in January 2001, Greece adopted the 
euro. Like many other Euro-enthusiasts the Dutch central banker was convinced that for the sake of 
European integration it was important to have as many countries as possible in the monetary union. 
Thus, possible risks were totally ignored. One could give a number of other examples of the 
unconcerned, not to say reckless, attitude which until recently prevailed among EU leaders – not just 
in monetary policy but in all areas of European competence. One of the roots of the EU political 
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culture of total optimism is the Monnet strategy of fait accompli, which consists in pushing ahead with 
European integration without worrying too much about public support or democratic legitimacy. In a 
similar way Paul-Henry Spaak, one of the first “European saints”, assumed that “everything which 
tends towards European organizations” was good, regardless of any other consideration (Majone 2014: 
47-52). 
Such views of European integration assumed that the success of a collective decision is determined by 
the decision makers themselves – by the very fact that they agreed on that particular decision – rather 
than by those who will be affected by the actual results it will eventually produce. This emphasis on 
the process of decision-making rather than on its outcomes excludes a priori the possibility of failure. 
“Technocratic” – the adjective often used with reference to decision-making in the EU – is the wrong 
label for such an attitude, since the first task of the expert consists in analysing the conditions under 
which a given task is feasible, and then determining whether the eventual obstacles – economic, 
political, or technological – may be removed, at acceptable costs, before the decision is implemented 
(Majone 1989:70-81). On the contrary, the question of feasibility has been systematically ignored by 
integrationist leaders. The so-called “bicycle theory” of European integration – according to which 
integration must keep moving forward, especially in a crisis, for the bicycle (that the EU is seen to be) 
not to fall – provides the conceptual justification of the strategy of fait accompli. Over the years 
systematic application of the Monnet-Spaak approach to integration has generated what may 
reasonably be called a political culture of total optimism. The basic features of this peculiar political 
culture emerged in the 1960s and early 1970s – the age of “permissive consensus”, when the 
integration project, being taken for granted by the European publics, did not seem to require any 
justification in terms of results. Such a benign attitude was facilitated by the fact that most European 
policies were too remote from the daily problems of the people to seriously concern public opinion. 
True, policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) or particular regulatory measures have 
been questioned and criticized often enough; but controversies and contestations always remained 
confined within fairly narrow political and academic circles, or within particular interest groups. 
I borrowed the expression “political culture of total optimism” from the historian Geoffrey Parker, 
who used it in his discussion of the grand strategy of Philip II of Spain. According to this historian, 
“Spain’s strategic culture absolutely demanded such total optimism: since it had to be assumed that 
God fought on Spain’s side and would therefore send success, any attempt to plan for possible failure 
could be construed as either “tempting Providence” or “denoting a lack of faith”. Of course, many 
other rulers of the past, as well as modern statesmen and strategists, also made the mistake of not 
taking the possibility of failure into account. “Philip II, however, left more to chance – or to 
“Providence” – than most statesmen, thanks to his complete confidence that God would make good 
any deficiencies and errors”. The consequences of the king’s total optimism were “a willingness to 
cast all caution to the winds and, equally dangerous, a failure to make contingency plans” (Parker 
1998: 107-8). 
Such a political culture could hardly survive in the conflictive politics of modern democracies, but it 
did take roots at the supranational level, where it facilitated collective decision-making by small elites. 
The total optimism of EU leaders does not spring from confidence in “Providence”, but from two 
more worldly sources. On the one hand, federalists derive confidence in the final success of their cause 
from the conviction that the nation state is no longer viable, at least in Europe. Like some intellectual 
leaders of the 1930s, such as Ortega y Gassett and Julien Benda, latter-day federalists believe that only 
the political union of the continent – a nation-state “writ large”- can save Europe from becoming 
irrelevant in a world dominated by a few superpowers of continental dimension. Federalists are 
convinced that sooner or later European citizens will acknowledge the necessity of political union, and 
will also understand why in certain situations it is necessary to accept risks that would be considered 
unacceptable in different contexts. But EU leaders who are not in favour of full political union also 
find it convenient to display total optimism concerning the outcomes of the collective decisions taken 
at the supranational level. This is because they have a vested interest in the preservation of a system 
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that, among other things, allows them to take unpopular measures in camera rather than in a direct 
confrontation with the opposition parties at home. 
 
As I show elsewhere (Majone 2014), this display of optimism regardless of actual results is facilitated 
by the fact that most decisions taken at the EU level must satisfy different, even conflicting, interests. 
For example, the decision to proceed with economic and monetary union was supported by leaders 
who saw EMU as a necessary step towards political union; by governments that wished to terminate 
the “tyranny of the German Mark”; and by national leaders who correctly assumed that membership in 
the euro zone would immediately improve the credit rating of their countries, allowing them to borrow 
at significantly lower rates of interest. A decision that has to satisfy many different interests must 
necessarily be ambiguous or incomplete or, most likely, both. A serious consequence of the political 
culture of EU elites is the fact that long-term consequences are heavily discounted or altogether 
ignored at the European level. This explains not only the absence of contingency plans and of any 
other instrument of crisis management, but also the willingness of European leaders to increase the 
risk of future failure for the sake of immediate advantages. It is indeed hard to find a better example of 
the willingness of EU leaders to compromise their collective credibility for the sake of short-term 
benefits than their decision to proceed with monetary union before there was any agreement on 
political union, and leaving a number of technical and institutional problems unresolved. But, to 
repeat, total optimism pervades every mode of decision- and policy-making at EU level. Its most 
serious consequences, to be discussed in the next two sections, are the refusal to assess the feasibility 
of even the most risky decisions; and the total disregard of the intrinsic limits of collective action. 
Ignoring feasibility constraints 
Total optimism implies a total disregard of the many constraint – technical, economic, political, 
institutional, and cultural – that even under the best conditions severely limit the range of possible 
choices in political and social life. As Michael Polanyi once observed: 
The existence of social tasks which appear both desirable and feasible and yet are in fact impracticable 
has set the stage throughout history for a wide range of human conflicts. All the battles of social reform 
were fought on these grounds, with conservatives often harshly overstating and progressives recklessly 
underestimating the limits of manageability (Polanyi 1951: 169). 
Feasibility analysis – a core element of the theory and practice of policy analysis – was developed 
precisely to help policymakers avoid both harsh overstatements and reckless underestimation of the 
limits of manageability of political and social tasks. The aim of this branch of policy analysis is to 
identify the most important constraints, evaluate their significance for different implementation 
strategies, and estimate the costs and benefits of relaxing those constraints that are not absolutely 
binding. Good policy analysts know that it is a mistake to define feasibility only in terms of a few, 
easily quantifiable limitations, such as technical or budgetary constraints. Feasibility conditions have 
been generally ignored by EU policymakers, however. Their insouciance about the feasibility of even 
the most ambitious goals is evident not only in the case of monetary union, but also of the Single 
Market project: the much advertised “Europe ’92” goal. The aim of this project was to open the 
internal borders of the EU to the free movement of goods, services, capital, and workers, as within a 
nation state – by 1992. This aim, writes Piris (2011: 15): 
is presented as having been more or less achieved, but the truth is that it is not complete, especially in 
the services sector. In many areas the Single Market exists in the books but, in practice, multiple 
barriers and regulatory obstacles fragment the intra-EU trade and hamper economic initiative and 
innovation. 
Piris points out that “the development of a single market in services” was still one of the proposals 
made by Mario Monti in 2010 in a report commissioned by the President of the European 
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Commission. In fact, a single market in services may not be achievable because of deep-rooted 
differences of historical and cultural traditions in the member states, as well as wide differences in 
levels of economic development. 
It is easy to provide additional evidence of the official insouciance about the feasibility of pet projects 
of EU leaders. Thus, at the summit held in the Portuguese capital in March 2000 the EU Council 
launched the so-called Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs. On that occasion the European leaders 
promised that by the year 2010 the Union would become “the most competitive, knowledge-based 
economy in the world”, leaving the U.S. economy lagging behind. In order to justify such an 
ambitious goal it was assumed that the EU would grow at an annual average rate of 3 per cent, so as to 
create 20 million new jobs; while maintaining a commitment to solidarity and equality and, of course, 
respecting the environment. The experts knew all along that the goal was in fact unfeasible, and the 
Lisbon Strategy was declared dead in 2011 by Commission President Barroso who, instead of 
explaining the reasons of the failure, used the occasion to announce the launching of a new “Europe 
2020” project. 
The large-scale enlargement of the years 2004-2007, with the consequent dramatic increase in 
socioeconomic heterogeneity within the EU, may be mentioned as yet another manifestation of the 
same lack of concern for potential problems. The original plans of opening accession negotiations with 
no more than five countries from Central and Eastern Europe (CEEC) – five being the number 
favoured by the Commission, while the government of Chancellor Kohl would have preferred to start 
with only Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary – were soon superseded by the decision to open 
formal accession negotiations with all ten CEEC candidates, plus Malta and Cyprus. The basic reason 
of the large-scale enlargement decided at the Luxembourg European Council of December 1997 was 
national or institutional self-interest, with each incumbent member state pushing for its own favoured 
candidates, and the Commission attempting to present enlargement as feasible without an increase of 
the EU budget, and without demanding too many sacrifices from the older member states. As 
Sedelmeier (2005: 453) writes, these assurances of the Commission “implied some very optimistic 
assumptions, notably real growth of the budget through annual growth in EU GDP of 2.5 per cent, but 
politically the important message was that the reforms needed for enlargement were ‘yesable’.” The 
point was that Eastern enlargement gave the Brussels bureaucracy an extraordinary opportunity to 
play, for the first time, a role of political leadership, and also, through the direct grants, the role of the 
patron vis-à-vis the CEEC. Hence the politically important message the Commission intended to 
convey was that the reforms needed for enlargement were feasible at no cost to the older member 
states. If the position of the Commission can be explained in terms of institutional self-interest, the 
acceptance by the member states of the “big bang” solution indicates a less rational attitude of the 
general lack of concern about possible future problems. Indeed it is difficult to see how, having 
already admitted ten countries from Central and Eastern Europe, the Union could refuse to admit, 
sooner or later, other South-Eastern countries, in addition to Croatia: Montenegro, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania, as well as Moldova, Ukraine and, possibly, 
Turkey and Georgia. Another “big bang” enlargement as in 2004-2007 is highly unlikely, but in the 
not too distant future the EU could comprise almost forty countries at vastly different levels of 
development, and with correspondingly different policy preferences and national priorities. 
Lack of concern about future problems entails not only a lack of preparations to meet new situations 
but also a sense of shocked surprise when problems arise. Consider the surprise resulting in 2005 from 
the rejection of the draft Constitutional Treaty by impressive majorities of French and Dutch voters – 
55 and 65.1 per cent, respectively. In an extraordinary meeting in Brussels in early June 2005 the 
Presidents of the Commission, of the European Parliament, and of the EU Council at first tried to 
minimize what had happened. They insisted that the ratification process should continue, so that at the 
end of 2006, when it was scheduled to be completed, a general reassessment of the situation could 
bemade. Their hopes were dashed by the British decision to postpone indefinitely the referendum 
originally planned for the first half of 2006. Denmark, the Czech Republic and Poland soon followed 
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the British example, reinforcing the general impression that the Constitutional Treaty was effectively 
dead. According to informed observers, moreover, the draft Constitution would not have passed 
popular consultations, not only in euro-sceptic countries like the UK, Denmark, or the Czech 
Republic, but even in Germany. Yet the possibility of a rejection of the draft Constitution had never 
been seriously considered in Brussels: by explicit admission of the president of the European 
Commission, no “Plan B” existed. 
After the bad experience with the Constitutional Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty was carefully drafted to 
avoid any reference, however remote, to terms like constitution, federalism, or political integration – 
the new treaty even fails to mention rather innocuous symbols of statehood such as the European flag 
and anthem. The treaty framers have also been generous in granting opt-outs, in the hope of 
convincing the national governments that ratification by popular referendum was unnecessary. 
However, all these stratagems failed to impress the Irish voters, who used the chance offered to them 
to vent their dissatisfaction with the European project by voting against the treaty. Given such 
precedents and the present state of public opinion, popular referenda are now viewed as potential 
hazards for the integration process, not just in traditionally euro-sceptic countries but in most member 
states, as well as in Brussels. Some authors go as far as speaking of a “referendum roulette”, but it 
seems highly unlikely that in the future it will be possible to force the referendum genie back into the 
bottle (Majone 2014: 184-89). 
After the first Irish vote against the Lisbon Treaty, demands for popular ratification of future European 
treaties have been advanced by leaders of different countries and political hues. In July 2008 Werner 
Faymann, then the social-democratic candidate for the Austrian federal election to take place the 
following September, came out in favour of popular referenda for all future treaty amendments and on 
other important EU issues. The Austrian Parliament had already ratified the Lisbon Treaty in April, 
but the social-democratic leader was obviously trying to improve his electoral chances by taking 
advantage of widespread EU-fatigue: at the time Eurobarometer data indicated that only 28 per cent of 
Austrian citizens still supported the EU, while in 1994 66.6 per cent had voted in favour of joining the 
Union. It remains to be seen how many national leaders will dare to submit to popular ratification the 
Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, signed in 
2012 as an international (rather than European) treaty between all member states other than the United 
Kingdom and the Czech Republic. 
Ignoring the limits of collective action 
Collective actors face peculiar limitations, in addition to the various economic, political and social 
constraints limiting the freedom of choice of single decision makers. It is commonly assumed that if 
all the members of a group agree on some common interest, then there would be a tendency for the 
group to seek to further this interest. Mancur Olson’s important contribution to political economy has 
been his proof that this familiar assumption is basically wrong (Olson 1971). The proof depends on the 
argument that the members of a group will not provide as much of the collective good as it would be 
in their common interest to provide. Such tendency towards sub-optimality is due to the fact that a 
collective good, such as economic integration, is available to all members of a group once it has been 
provided. Since an individual member gets only part of the benefit of any expenditure she makes to 
obtain more of the collective good, she will discontinue her purchase of it before the optimal amount 
for the group as a whole has been obtained. 
In some small groups (like the original Six of the 1951 Paris and 1957 Rome Treaties) one or two 
members may find that they would be better off if the collective good were provided – even if they 
had to pay the entire cost of providing it themselves – than they would be if it were not provided at all. 
In such situations there is a presumption that the collective good will be produced. Thus in small 
groups, where each member gets a substantial portion of the total gain simply because there are few 
others in the group, a collective good can often be produced by the voluntary, self-interested action of 
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the members of the group. Actually, the greatest likelihood that a collective good will be provided 
occurs in the case of small groups of members of unequal size (again, the case of the original six 
members of the original European Communities); for the greater the interest of any single member in 
the collective good, the greater the likelihood that this member will get such a significant portion of 
the total benefit from the provision of the good that she will gain from seeing that the good is 
produced, even if she has to pay the entire cost herself. Even in the smallest groups, however, the 
members of the group will not provide as much of the good as it would be in their common interest to 
have. 
The logic of collective action operates not only in groups of individuals but also in the case of 
organizations of states. An interesting example of this is provided by the well-known historian 
Heinrich August Winkler in the first volume of his Geschichte des Westens (2012: 760). According to 
the 1821 “federal war constitution” (Bundeskriegsverfassung) of the German confederation (Bund), no 
state was allowed to participate with more than three army corps to the confederate army. This rule 
was dictated by the desire to avoid even the appearance of the supremacy of one member state over the 
other members of the Bund. The Prussian state was a member of the Bund, but important Prussian 
territories – East and West Prussia, and Posen – were not part of the German confederation. For this 
reason Prussia was allowed to have nine, rather than three, army corps. Because of this, the other 
German states could assume that in case of a foreign threat Prussia would mobilize its entire military 
might. As a consequence they kept their contribution to the common defence well below the limit 
allowed by the constitution of the Bund. 
In sum, the size of the group is a key element in the logic of collective action, and “the larger the 
group, the further it will fall short of providing an optimal amount of a collective good” (Olson 1971: 
35; italics in the original). Olson concludes that if larger groups/organizations do in fact exist this is 
not because of the collective good they provide but because of the power of coercion they may enjoy 
(as in the case of a national government) or because of selective (positive or negative) incentives that 
voluntary organizations may provide. A selective incentive is one that applies selectively to the 
individuals (or subgroups) depending on whether they do or do not contribute to the provision of the 
collective good. A well-known example of selective incentive in the context of the EC/EU is the 
Common Agriculture Policy, a positive incentive originally offered to France for its support of 
European integration. 
Unfortunately, the larger the group the more difficult it becomes to provide suitable selective 
incentives to all its members. In case of the EU the availability of such incentives is limited not only 
by the size of the group and the budget constraints, but also by the growing socioeconomic 
heterogeneity of its membership. An even more basic problem in organizing and maintaining socially 
and economically heterogeneous groups is due to the fact that the members are less likely to agree on 
the exact nature of whatever collective good is at issue, or on how much of it is worth “buying”. In the 
EU context we have the traditional cleavage between countries that wish to limit integration to the 
economic sphere and those that support also political integration. Consensus on such matters is 
especially difficult because the defining characteristic of collective goods – that they go to everyone in 
the group if they are provided at all – entails that all the members of the group have to accept whatever 
level and type of the good is provided. The applicability of Mancur Olson’s analysis to the case of 
European integration could be demonstrated by other significant examples, such as the inability to 
produce a collective foreign policy (see Majone 2014: 253-7). It is therefore rather surprising that the 
intrinsic limits of collective action have been generally ignored by political scientists, legal scholars 
and even by economists writing about the EU. 
Process vs. outcomes 
As the discussion of the preceding sections suggests, a culture of total optimism can only survive in a 
system of governance where process counts much more than concrete results. One of the major, but 
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generally overlooked, consequences of the crisis of monetary union is the radical change in the criteria 
used to assess the performance of the EU. Traditionally, decisions and policies made at the European 
level have been discussed and assessed in terms of process – institution building; decision-making 
procedures; volume of legislation; expansion of competences; whether or not consensus was achieved 
on a particular Commission proposal, and so on – rather than in terms of results which the citizens 
could see and evaluate. In the Commission’s 2001 White Paper on European Governance, for 
example, the good governance principles are largely concerned, not with the ultimate decision/policy 
to be adopted, much less with expected outcomes, but with the way in which decisions are reached 
(Smith 2012: 276; Shore 2006: 719). The primacy assigned to process has enabled political leaders, 
eurocrats, and most scholars, to depict European integration in the most optimistic terms – as a 
positive-sum game for everybody concerned. A good example is provided by the opening lines of the 
2001 White Paper, claiming that European integration has delivered fifty years of stability, peace and 
economic prosperity. The same optimistic message has been sent by EU leaders on every possible 
occasion, at least before the beginning of the euro-crisis. Now we know that the truth is less rosy. In 
terms of such concrete results as faster growth, higher productivity, rising employment levels, or 
greater technological innovation the empirical evidence presents quite a different picture. 
It is certainly true that Europe experienced unprecedented prosperity in the decades immediately 
following the end of World War II, but economists and statisticians have shown that the influence of 
the integration process on the economic development of the continent has been minimal. If that 
causation cannot be clearly established – and most accurate quantitative studies indicate that the gains 
from the Common Market were very small in relation to the increases in income that the member 
states enjoyed in the 1950s and 1960s – then it must be admitted that the myth of fifty years of 
prosperity made possible by European integration rests on the post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy: 
inferring a causal connection from a mere sequence in time (Majone 2009: 81-87). After the phase of 
very rapid catch-up with the United States in the immediate post-war period – that is to say, even 
before the European Economic Community was established – convergence in the levels of per capita 
income stopped at the beginning of the 1980s and has remained unchanged since, at around 70 per 
cent of the US level. During the 1990s growth of EU GDP was disappointing both in absolute terms 
and with regard to the US; overall growth slowed from the 1980s, which itself had slowed from the 
1970s. A common trade policy, the customs union, a supranational competition policy, extensive 
harmonization of national laws and regulations, the Single Market project, and finally a centralized 
monetary policy, apparently made no difference as far as the economic performance of the EC/EU, 
relative to its major competitors, was concerned. While the American economy was generating 
employment as well as maintaining working hours, Europe’s employment performance was weak and 
working hours fell consistently (Sapir et al. 2004). As a matter of fact, not only are we still far from 
having a single European market, but the EU market is today even more segmented along national 
lines than it was a couple of decades ago. The main reason of this paradoxical state of affairs is that in 
all advanced economies the services sector has been continuously growing in terms of share of GDP. 
Today it represents more than seventy per cent of the GDP of the old EU-15, and services are still 
largely regulated at the national level. 
Monetary union was also assessed in terms of process, at least in its early stages. The launch of the 
common currency in 1999, and the smooth introduction of euro notes and coins and phasing out of the 
national currencies in 2002 were taken, even by some experts, as more or less conclusive evidence of 
success of the most risky project in the history of European integration. Shortly after the introduction 
of the common currency a well-known monetary economist claimed that the launch of the euro had 
been not only a technical and economic, but “also and foremost” a political success The fact that “it 
took only a few weeks for the euro to become the single European currency used in daily transactions 
from Finland to Portugal and from Ireland to Greece” was seen as definite proof of the success of the 
single currency. Thus: “The euro is the most visible and practical symbol of the progress towards a 
political union in Europe” (De Grauwe 2004: 363). In this as in many other cases, the process was 
celebrated without waiting for the actual results. Some years later, Otmar Issing – a member of the 
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executive board of the ECB from 1998 to 2006, who later became a severe critic of the Trichet 
presidency – would still write that “the common currency has become an irreversible reality…Over 
the nine years that have passed since its birthday on 1 January 1999, the euro has been a striking 
success” (Issing 2008:1-2). This is one more evaluation in terms of process: recent data show that per 
capita GDP in the euro zone, outside Germany, has actually declined since the beginning of monetary 
union. Empirical evidence only confirms what policy analysts have known for a long time; namely, 
that evaluation by process is quite different from evaluation by results; and that these two modes of 
policy evaluation serve different purposes and appeal to different publics. 
The fact that until recently most EU policies were too remote from daily problems to seriously concern 
public opinion is the main reason why people did not notice for so long the gap between poor or 
mediocre results and official enthusiastic evaluations – in terms of process criteria. Moreover, it was 
difficult for ordinary citizens, and sometimes even for experts, to allocate responsibility for 
unsatisfactory outcomes as between “Brussels” and the national governments. Occasional complaints 
about the disappointing economic performance of the EU could be answered by reminding the critics 
that Community competences did not include macroeconomic policymaking. What makes the crisis of 
the euro zone so important also from the point of view of evaluation criteria is the fact that the actual 
consequences of decisions taken at the European level are now much more visible than they were in 
earlier stages of the integration process. As the buyers of finished products are typically interested in 
the quality of the product, not in the production process, so the “buyers” of public policy – voters and 
the citizens at large – are interested in the quality and tax-prices of specific policy outcomes, not in 
administrative procedures and inter-state bargaining. Thus, a crucially important, if paradoxical, 
consequence of the decision to proceed with monetary union is the possibility now offered to 
everybody to question the effectiveness of a key European policy. Unlike most policy decisions taken 
in Brussels, the decisions taken by the ECB are widely advertised, and their consequences have a 
direct impact on the welfare of all inhabitants of the euro zone, indeed of the entire EU. Since the 
beginning of the crisis of the euro zone, moreover, everybody realizes that integration entails costs as 
well as benefits, and that a positive net balance of benefits over costs can no longer be taken for 
granted. This new realism is likely to generate a much stronger demand of accountability by results – 
precisely what is foreign to the political culture of total optimism of EU leaders (Majone 2014: 58-62). 
Once results become visible, not only the political but also the normative consequences of failures to 
deliver the goods can be significant. 
Legitimacy, writes Martin Lipset, involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain 
the belief that its institutions are capable of resolving the major problems facing society. He goes on to 
explain that while effectiveness is primarily instrumental, legitimacy is evaluative. Nevertheless, the 
two concepts are linked:  
After a new social structure is established, if the new system is unable to sustain the expectations of 
major groups (on the ground of “effectiveness”) for a long enough period to develop legitimacy upon 
the new basis, a new crisis may develop…On the other hand, a breakdown of effectiveness, repeatedly 
or for a long period, will endanger even a legitimate systems stability (Lipset 1963: 65; 67-8). 
It is this connection between effectiveness, legitimacy, and systemic stability which makes the 
unsatisfactory economic performance of the last decades so worrisome, and the present crisis of the 
euro zone in particular. Indeed, the basic reason why today public debate and hostile public reactions 
have replaced the permissive consensus of the past – when the integration project was seemingly taken 
for granted by European voters as part of the political landscape – is precisely the fact that monetary 
union has put an end to the primacy of process as the criterion of policy evaluation in the EU. As long 
as the permissive consensus lasted, the issue of the democratic deficit did not arise. The consensus 
began to erode as the EC/EU enlarged and acquired more powers, first with the Single European Act 
and later with the Maastricht Treaty. Indeed, the ratification crisis of this treaty – which led to the opt-
outs of Great Britain and Denmark from monetary union – showed that by the early 1990s  
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a permissive consensus no longer existed. This was the time when the democratic deficit became a 
serious issue. 
Some EU leaders now argue that even if European integration has not delivered all the hoped-for 
economic benefits, at least it has delivered fifty years of peace and stability in Europe. It is certainly 
true that since the end of the World War II Western Europe has enjoyed over half a century of 
uninterrupted peace. What is doubtful, however, is the causal role of European integration in 
preserving peace in the old continent. A moment’s reflection suggests that it is hardly believable that 
after the disastrous results of two world wars in fifty years, Europeans had either the resources or the 
will to use again military means to resolve their conflicts – a conclusion which the distinguished 
Princeton economist, Albert Hirschman, had already reached three decades ago:  
[T]he European Community arrived a bit late in history for its widely proclaimed mission, which was to 
avert further wars between the major Western European nations; even without the Community the time 
for such wars was past after the two exhausting world wars of the first half of the twentieth century” 
(Hirschman 1981: 281; emphasis in the original). 
Aspirations to enduring peace and “repudiation of war” expressed in the post-1945 constitutions of 
countries like Germany and Italy reveal the reluctance of the member states of the EU to engage in 
military actions – not only in distant theatres, but even in Europe’s backyard. When the Yugoslav 
crisis broke out in June 1991, Jacques Poos, then foreign minister of Luxembourg and President of the 
European Council for the first six months of that year, declared: “This is the hour of Europe, not the 
hour of the Americans” (cited in Gordon and Shapiro 2004: 33). Unfortunately, the EU proved unable 
to enforce stability and peaceful coexistence among the peoples of the former federation, and had to 
appeal to the United States for help. The civil war in Bosnia was ended by the intervention of the 
American superpower, which then mediated and guaranteed the Dayton Agreement of November 1995 
between Serbs, Croatians, and Moslems. Four years later, this time in Kosovo, the EU displayed again 
its inability to ensure peace and respect of basic human rights even in areas of clear European interest 
(Majone 2009: 87-90). 
In sum, the times are past when integrationist leaders could focus on process, thus keeping European 
issues out of political controversy. The immediate consequence of the ongoing process of 
politicization is that political entrepreneurs now have the opportunity of differentiating themselves 
from more traditional parties in terms of European issues; so that bargains struck in Brussels and 
decisions taken in Frankfurt can now be contested at the national level. From Stockholm to Prague, 
from Berlin to Rome, the trend is becoming too visible to be ignored or dismissed as irrelevant for the 
future of European integration – witness the impressive growth of euro-sceptic parties at the last 
European elections. 
From total optimism to panic-driven austerity 
In January 2009 EU leaders celebrated the tenth anniversary of the successful launching of Economic 
and Monetary Union. This success, the euro-enthusiasts claimed, was not only technical and 
economic, but also, and foremost, political: the common currency was going to be the solid foundation 
of a politically united Europe. One year later, the same leaders were facing the possible bankruptcy of 
some members of the euro zone. Chancellor Angela Merkel, on the occasion of the Bundestag debate 
on financial help to Greece of 7 May 2010, went as far as asserting that the crisis of the common 
currency was nothing less than an existential threat for Germany and for Europe. The monetary union, 
she concluded, is a “community of destiny” (Schicksalsgemeinschaft): “if the euro fails then Europe 
fails”. And Wolfgang Schaeuble, her Finance Minister, added: “We must defend this common 
European currency as a whole…By defending it we defend at the same time the European project” 
(citations in Der Spiegel of 17 May 2010: 80). How can we explain the switch from the traditional 
mood of total optimism to the catastrophism of the leaders of the largest European economy?  
The Deeper Euro-Crisis or: The Collapse of the EU Political Culture of Total Optimism 
11 
The most obvious explanation is that by insisting that the survival of the EU depends on the survival 
of monetary union, the German leaders were attempting, first of all, to impress their own voters with 
the exceptional gravity of the situation. At the same time they wanted to convince present and future 
euro-zone members of the need to accept tighter coordination and closer control of national economic 
and fiscal policies, as well as greater harmonization of important aspects of social policy. These 
ambitious objectives were clearly spelled out by the German chancellor when, at the end of January 
2011, she advanced the idea of a “Pact for Competitiveness” as a first step towards a future economic 
government of the euro zone. The pact would have obligated all euro zone members to adhere to 
sound fiscal and social policies, including an age limit for pensions to reflect demographic 
developments, and modest wage increases that would no longer be adapted automatically to rising 
prices. Finance minister Schaeuble also expressed the hope that the sovereign-debt crisis of the euro 
zone could convince the other member states not only that a centralized monetary policy must be 
supported by the delegation of responsibility for macroeconomic policymaking to the supranational 
level, but also by far-reaching harmonization of domestic, and in particular social, policies. In this way 
the sovereign-debt crisis would actually help to achieve those quasi-federalist aims which after the 
rejection of the Constitutional Treaty and the difficult ratification of the Lisbon Treaty had seemed to 
recede into an ever more distant future. However, even leaders of countries that traditionally supported 
Germany’s position, such as The Netherlands, Luxembourg and Austria, were severely critical of 
Merkel’s Pact for Competitiveness. 
The fact that only one year later most national leaders were prepared to accept even more stringent 
conditions than those foreseen by the Pact is a clear indication of the steady worsening of the crisis. A 
new, much stricter, regime of regulation and control of national budgetary and economic 
policymaking was established in 2012 by the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the 
Economic and Monetary Union (“Stability Treaty”, signed as an international treaty by all EU member 
states other than the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic), together with a group of regulations, 
issued in 2011, concerning enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro zone; enforcement 
measures to correct excessive macroeconomic imbalances; strengthening of the surveillance and 
coordination of economic policies; and the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances. 
The aim of the new regime is to ensure that the members of the euro zone fulfil three main duties: to 
achieve a balanced budget; to avoid an excessive government deficit; and to prevent or correct 
macroeconomic imbalances – the latter duty being in fact a general obligation of all member states, 
since it concerns general economic policy rather than monetary and fiscal policy. A political culture of 
total optimism could hardly survive in the new atmosphere of panic-driven austerity. 
Beyond excessive optimism and enforced austerity: rethinking the union of Europe post-
crisis 
In his well-known work about the crisis of the 1920s and ‘30s E.H. Carr writes: “The conception of 
politics as an infinite process seems in the long run uncongenial or incomprehensible to the human 
mind. Every political leader who wishes to make an appeal to his contemporaries is consciously or 
unconsciously led to posit a finite goal” (Carr [1939] 1964:89). Carr’s warning has been 
systematically ignored by the advocates of EU-style integration. Thus the Preamble of the 1997 
consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union reaffirms the resolution of the member states 
“to continue the process of ever closer union among the peoples of Europe”. The obvious problem 
with this and equivalent statements is that the expression “ever closer union” is meaningless as a goal 
until the nature of the sought union is specified. To some of the early and most vocal advocates of 
European integration “union” simply meant “political” or, more precisely, “federal” union. However, 
contemporary federal states tend to be centralized – to a degree that is simply unthinkable in case of 
the European Union. Thus James Buchanan, the Nobel-Prize winner economist, writes: “It is mockery 
to use ‘federalism’ or ‘federal union’ in descriptive reference to the United States of 1990, which is, of 
course, simply a very large nation-state” (Buchanan 1990: 6). Even a “good European” like Juergen 
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Habermas admits that the dream of a “federal Europe” is just that: a fanciful vision. At the same time, 
Habermas keeps stressing the need “to begin the process of moving towards political union, beginning 
with the core Europe of the 17 EMU member countries”. “Only a politically united core Europe”, he 
and his co-authors argue, “offers any hope of reversing the process – already far advanced – of 
transforming a citizens’ democracy built on the idea of the social state into a sham democracy 
governed by market principles”. What they advocate is a treaty change: 
designed to bring about the establishment of a politically unified European currency area, which other 
countries – in particular Poland – would be allowed to join. This calls for clear thinking about the 
political make-up of a supra-national democracy that would allow collective government without 
assuming the form of a federal state. The European federal state is the wrong model, demanding more 
solidarity than the historically autonomous European nations are willing to contemplate. 
They conclude: 
The peoples of Europe must learn that they can only preserve their welfare-state model of society and 
the diversity of their nation-state culture by joining forces and working together. They must pool their 
resources – if they want to exert any kind of influence on the international political agenda and the 
solution of global problems. To abandon European unification now would be to quit the world stage for 
good (Bofinger, Habermas, and Nida-Ruemelin 2012). 
The main problem with the argument of these distinguished German scholars is their assumption that 
there is only one type of European integration – an assumption that is logically and historically false. 
The variety of modes of integration and interstate cooperation was always the distinguishing feature of 
the European polity – a variety which has made Europe different from, and more dynamic than, the 
centralized empires of the past. As Eric Jones has stressed, for most of its history Europe formed a 
cultural, economic, even a political unity. Of course, it was a special type of unity that did not exclude 
frequent, if limited, wars: unity in diversity, embodied in a system of states competing and cooperating 
with each other. Such a system realized the benefits of competitive decision-making and the 
economies of scale of the centralized empire, giving Europe some of the best of both worlds. In the 
words of the British historian: 
This picture of a Europe which shared in salient respects a common culture…and formed something of 
a single market demonstrates that political decentralisation did not mean a fatal loss of economies of 
scale in production and distribution. The states system did not thwart the flow of capital and labour to 
the constituent states offering the highest marginal return” (Jones 1987: 117). 
The system of European states always opposed any attempt to unify the continent under the leadership 
of a great power that would pre-empt the sovereignty of the other members of the system. Even at the 
peak of their power neither Spain nor France or Germany succeeded in establishing a European 
empire. Each time the freedom of the European system of states hung precariously in the balance. Yet 
each time, the forces seeking to preserve the balance in the system were victorious over those that 
would upset it (Dehio 1962). The member states of the EU are also extremely reluctant to accept the 
leadership of one member of their group; indeed, even the largest and economically most powerful 
member of the Union is extremely reluctant to assume such a role. This reluctance is rooted in history, 
but also in the contemporary ideology of European integration. A key element of this ideology is the 
basic equality and equal dignity of all the member states, from the smallest to the largest: no leader but 
a “collective leadership” as the principle of equality of all member states has been characterized. A 
direct consequence of this principle is the fact that nobody can claim to govern the Union – hence the 
absence of the traditional government-opposition dialectic. The European Commission, which many 
Euro-enthusiasts used to see as the kernel of the future government of a federal Europe, in fact looks 
more and more like an international bureaucracy and less and less like a proto-government. 
Knowledgeable observers of the European scene have recently noted that even the European Council – 
the most likely candidate to provide leadership at the supranational level – is only able to achieve what 
the member states want it to achieve, with agreements hammered out, often bilaterally, beyond its 
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walls. What most students of European integration have failed to analyze, however, are the limits of 
what a polity based on collective leadership may be expected to achieve (Majone 2014: 14-9). 
The alleged comparative advantage of the EU model with respect to other regional organizations has 
usually been attributed to the extent of the powers delegated to the supranational institutions. What is 
seldom mentioned, however, is that a high level of supranational institutionalization entails 
considerable transaction costs, so that in terms of the net benefits of integration the superiority of the 
European model is far from being obvious. The results achieved by regional organizations such as the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the Australian-New Zealand Trade Agreement 
(ANZCERTA) show that extensive economic integration is possible without elaborate institutional 
and legal superstructures. Harry Johnson and other distinguished economists had argued the same 
point in the early days of the European Economic Community, without however influencing the public 
discourse (Majone 2009: 185-6). Unless we are willing to assume that the founding fathers of 
communitarian Europe were either naïve or uninformed we must conclude that the rationale behind the 
unique development of the EU’s supranational institutions is political rather than economic. 
The problem is that a politically integrated Europe, in the sense in which “political integration” is 
commonly understood today, was and continues to be an elitist project. In the course of more than half 
a century of integration efforts a certain Europeanization of intellectual, economic, and political elites 
has taken place, yet this process has hardly touched the vast majority of European citizens. All 
attempts to induce a transfer of loyalties from the national to the supranational level – not only by 
propaganda and cultural actions but, more concretely, by such measures as the direct election of the 
European Parliament, various social-policy measures, including the “welfare state for farmers” 
represented by the Common Agricultural Policy, and policies of regional aid – failed completely. In 
the early stages of integration the reaction of the Euro-elites to this unsatisfactory situation was to 
claim that popular support was not necessary, after all. Thus Ernst Haas and his neo-functionalist 
school argued that the bureaucratized nature of European states implies that all crucial decisions are 
made by elites: public policymakers, as well as economic elites, trade unions, professional 
associations, business lobbies, and so on. Public opinion, on the other hand, was deemed to be 
unimportant.  
Unfortunately, neofunctionalist scholars and integrationist leaders alike overestimated the 
effectiveness of supranational institutions. The superior problem-solving capacity of these institutions 
– a superiority assumed a priori rather than supported by concrete evidence – was supposed to produce 
a sufficient normative basis for the integration project by inducing the progressive transfer of the 
loyalties and political demands of social groups from the national to the European level. Since the late 
1970s, however, the effectiveness of the supranational institutions has been increasingly questioned. 
Recent developments support a growing conviction that an ever widening and deepening integration 
process has proved impotent to arrest the decline of Europe’s economy relative to its major 
international competitors. What is increasingly questioned is less the general idea of integration than 
the particular integration method followed so far. It is time, therefore, to consider more carefully 
alternative approaches suggested in the past by a few critics of the prevailing orthodoxy. 
An alternative approach to regional integration, advocated by David Mitrany in the 1940s and by 
Ralph Dahrendorf in the 1970s, is based on a functional, rather than territorial, view of integration. A 
territorial union, according to Mitrany, binds together some interests which are not of common 
concern to the group, while it inevitably “cuts asunder some interests of common concern to the group 
and those outside it”. To avoid such “twice-arbitrary surgery” it is necessary to proceed by “binding 
together those interests which are common, where they are common, and to the extent to which they 
are common”. Thus the essential principle of a functional organization of international activities “is 
that activities would be selected specifically and organized separately, each according to its nature, to 
the conditions under which it has to operate, and to the needs of the moment” (citations in Eilstrup-San 
Giovanni 2006: 47). At the same time, Mitrany was sceptical about the advantages of political union. 
His main objection to schemes for continental unions was that the closer the union the more inevitably 
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would it be dominated by the most powerful member. Dahrendorf’s notion of integration à la carte 
also led to the conclusion that there should be common European policies only in areas where the 
member states have a common interest. While not excluding a priori the possibility of a European 
political union, eventually, the future Lord Dahrendorf maintained that no country should be forced to 
participate in everything. Integration à la carte was not ideal, but it was much better than “avoiding 
anything that cannot be cooked in a single pot”. 
Neither these nor other ideas of differentiated integration were based on, or inspired by, any formal 
theory. In fact, James Buchanan’s economic theory of clubs can provide a robust conceptual basis for 
the analysis of integration à la carte and other forms of functional integration. According to 
Buchanan’s theory, a “club good” is a collective good from whose benefits individuals may be (or 
may choose to be) excluded; an association established to provide an excludable public good is a 
“club” (Buchanan 1965). The same definitions apply if instead of individuals we consider independent 
states. Associations of independent states, such as alliances or leagues, are typically voluntary, and 
their members are exclusively entitled to enjoy certain benefits produced by the association. The club 
goods in question could be collective security, policy coordination, common technical standards – or a 
monetary union limited to a subset of members of the association. In these as in many other cases, 
countries unwilling or unable to share the costs are usually excluded from the benefits of inter-state 
cooperation in a particular project. The important point is that as an association of states expands, 
becoming more diverse in its preferences and its socioeconomic conditions, the cost of uniformity in 
the provision of collective goods can escalate dramatically. The economic theory of clubs predicts an 
increase in the number of voluntary associations to meet the increased demand of goods more 
precisely tailored to the different requirements of various subsets of more homogeneous states. 
Aggregate welfare is maximized when the variety in preferences is matched by a corresponding 
variety of institutional arrangements. It follows that top-down harmonization may be desirable when 
the market is relatively small and homogeneous. In a large market, on the other hand, harmonization 
tends to be brought about by the recognition of similar demands, rather than by a policy imposed from 
the top. Hence a multiplicity of club goods replaces policy harmonization. 
A Europe of clubs organized around functional tasks would not exclude the possibility of large 
projects supported by all the member states – as long as there is clear evidence (through referenda, 
supermajorities in national parliaments, and so on) of sufficient popular support. This is precisely the 
point Ralph Dahrendorf emphasized in the 1970s. The Single Market project, unlike monetary union, 
seems to enjoy broad support even in so-called euro-sceptic countries. Hence, it would be a natural 
starting point for assessing the extent of popular support in favour of further movement in the direction 
of closer integration. Once decisions about the extent of integration are no longer taken in camera but 
are submitted to the decision of the voters, however, the provision of correct information – about the 
expected benefits and costs of new advances, and about successes and failures of past policies – 
becomes truly indispensable. Even in case of a project like the Single Market, for example, the general 
public should know that the promise of reaching that goal by 1992 is still far from being fulfilled even 
today; and they should also be informed about the reasons for the delay (Majone 2014: 320-1). 
In sum, both history and logic tell us that there are different possible modes of European integration. 
The depth of the present crisis strongly suggests that the approach followed since the 1957 Rome 
Treaty has reached, if not overstepped, its limits. Only a political culture of total optimism could 
induce European leaders to confuse process with actual results. What is needed today is more 
modesty, greater realism and, especially, clearly defined and popularly supported goals. 
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